Introduction
As of this writing in June 2016, the markets are predicting that Venezuela is on the brink of defaulting on its sovereign debt. On June 1, 2016, the 6 month CDS contract traded at about 7,000 bps which translates into a likelihood of default of over 90%. Our particular interest in the Venezuelan crisis is that its outstanding sovereign bonds have a unique set of contractual features that, in combination with its near-default status, have created a natural experiment. This experiment has the potential to shed light on one of the long standing questions that sits at the intersection of the fields of law and finance.
The question is the degree to which financial markets price contract terms. Under a robust conception of the efficient markets theory, one would expect all relevant public information to get incorporated into the price of a financial security. And that would certainly include information as to the contract terms of a bond that are key to determining the investor's payout when the debtor defaults. But empirical testing of the question of how efficient the sovereign debt markets really are vis-à-vis contract terms has proved difficult for a variety of reasons, the primary one being that data is rarely available that allows a clean comparison of bonds of the same issuer that are similar in all other characteristics except for a particular contract term (where that contract term has a meaningful likelihood of impacting the investor's payout).
One prominent instance that created a natural experiment that allowed testing of the above proposition was the Greek default in 2012. In that restructuring, Greece paid different types of bonds different payouts as a function of their legal terms; most prominently their governing law and guarantee status. And researchers have found evidence that the markets did anticipate the prediction that the 1 Governing law and guarantee status though are highly salient contract terms. They are features that are obvious to investors from the very front page of the prospectus or offering circular. For example, every investor presumably knows whether he holds a local-law government bond or a foreignlaw one. One just has to look at the length of the sales documents; the former is often no more than a page or two whereas the latter can go into the hundreds of pages of fine print. But what about small differences in the fine print? Are the markets aware of these smaller differences in the legalese and are they able to price securities accordingly?
In the sovereign debt literature, there has been much debate about this question in the context of one contract term in particular: the collective action clause or CAC. The reason for the interest in the pricing of this term, which started roughly in 1995 after the so-called "Tequila crisis" in Mexico, is that the inclusion of this particular type of contract term has been advocated on multiple occasions by a number of policy makers and researchers as a way to improve the international financial architecture. 2 At the time, the standard contract term governing modifications for foreign sovereign bonds under New York law required unanimous approval of the creditors for any changes to be made to the payment terms of the bond (e.g., principal, interest, maturity, currency). That unanimity requirement, in turn, meant that any attempt at debt restructuring was subject to a significant risk of holdouts. And that risk of the holdouts grabbing a disproportionate share of the pie made all creditors reluctant to enter an exchange. A shift to a lower vote threshold, such as 75% of the creditors, where a super majority could do a cram-down of dissenting creditors--similar to what most domestic bankruptcy systems allow--was more sensible, the advocates of the CACs argued. Some of them explained that the unanimity provision in New York law bonds was the product of mindless copying from New York law corporate law bond
The counter argument, made by opponents of the CAC reform proposals, was that the unanimity requirement was the product of rational contracting; and was a way for debtors to commit to creditors not to engage in strategic default. 4 To cut a long story short, the theoretical debate remains as yet unresolved. As a practical matter though, the advocates of CACs won. Starting in April 2003, almost every single New York law governed sovereign bond has moved away from unanimity provisions towards a vote requirement of less than that (usually 75%).
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What interests us here is one of the primary rationales that was given for resolving the debate. And that was that regardless of the merits of the theoretical arguments over whether the unanimity provision was an inefficient historical artifact or a rational attempt to use contracts to constrain moral hazard, markets didn't pay attention to small wording differences in contract terms. 6 Further, the argument went, if markets weren't going to price the difference between a unanimity requirement for the modification of key terms and a 75% CAC, then the issuer had every incentive to include the CAC in its bond contracts.
The basis for the foregoing argument was a series of papers that found that bonds with CACs and bonds without CACs did not seem to be priced very differently. 7 There were questions that could be raised about these initial studies though in that they were usually comparing bonds issued under English law (that tended to have CACs) versus bonds under New York law (that tended to have unanimity provisions). But English and New York law vary in many ways and the contracts written under them also tend to vary in ways well beyond a single provision. Further, the countries who issued in one jurisdiction tended to be different from the ones issuing in the other; adding to the apples versus oranges character of the first generation of CAC pricing studies. Finally, there tend to be a plethora of non-legal factors
The current Venezuelan crisis though has potentially given us a natural experiment to test the foregoing question, albeit in a limited setting. For reasons explained below, Venezuela turns out to have three sets of bonds with different modification provisions-and these are all under New York law and largely identical in all other respects other than their CACs. Further, Venezuela is in deep crisis; as of this writing, its probability of default within the next six months is north of 90%. This is important because this is the scenario where, in theory, legal terms should be most important to market participants. And finally, given the politics of its current government and the general oil glut there is a very low expectation of a bailout from the IMF, any other Official Sector institution. 8 Put simply, we have a country with multiple bonds under the same law (New York) that have small differences in their contract terms that should matter a great deal to the likely payouts that the holders of these bonds will receive in the event of a default. 9 We have no doubt that there are some market players who have recognized these differences in contract terms; there have been multiple articles in the financial press noting these differences in legal terms in the Venezuelan sovereign bonds.
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The question though is whether this recognition of the variation in contract terms has become widespread enough that it is reflected in the bond prices. 
The Variation in the Venezuelan Bonds
The reason for there being small differences in the currently outstanding Venezuelan bonds has to do with an unusual set of circumstances surrounding the shift to CACs in the New York market in 2003 and 2004. As noted earlier, there was considerable uncertainty at the time as to how the markets would react to the change in contract terms. In particular, there were those who feared that the markets would react negatively to sovereigns making it easier for them to restructure (that is, investors would charge a higher interest rate to lend to these sovereigns).
Under pressure from the Official Sector institutions such as the IMF and the US Treasury though a number of emerging market sovereigns finally agreed to shift to CACs in early 2003.
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But the open question was what the vote threshold for these CACs would be. A drafting committee set up by the G-10 group of countries suggested a 75% vote threshold, but others were advocating higher votes amounts such as 85%. The result was that there was a short period of experimentation and competition where one group of countries, led by Mexico and its lawyers (Cleary Gottlieb), pushed for the 75% vote threshold to be the market standard and another group and led by Brazil and its lawyers (Arnold & Porter), tried 85%.
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The market did not seem to be imposing an undue penalty on the 75% bonds as compared to the 85% ones and by late 2004 the New York law market had coalesced at the 75% mark. provision, that the external world was focused on, the Venezuelan lawyers also made a tiny change in a different provision of their bonds, the now infamous pari passu clause. 
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After all, its specific wording in the Argentine bonds was the basis upon which the New York courts granted the holdout creditors the weapon they needed to bring Argentina to its knees. 16 But back in 2003, the clause was rather obscure to all but obsessive sovereign debt market watchers. It is easiest to illustrate the change by pointing to the actual language in the contracts, which we reproduce below in relevant part. The pari passu clause in the 2003 Venzuelan bond said, 14 We do not know, and have not been able to find out, whether the insertion of these additional words was the product of clever lawyers on the part of Venezuela's counsel or an unthinking change. For those interested in this question, two factors might be relevant. As a practical matter though, for a New York court it is the explicit language of the contract rather than speculation about what was in the contract drafter's heads that is likely to control its interpretation. [will] at all times rank at least equally with all its other payment obligations relating to External Public Debt . . . 18 We see above that the November 2003 (85%) bond has eleven crucial extra words in its pari passu clause, "save for such exceptions as may be provided by applicable legislation" that the equivalent clause in the July 1998 (100%) bond does not contain. Relevant here, for our purposes, is that these eleven words arguably negate the power of the creditor to use the pari passu clause as a weapon because the "save for such exceptions as may be provided by applicable legislation" modifier that applies to the pari passu clause suggests that the sovereign debtor can, by "applicable legislation" change the pari passu ranking of the bonds whenever it wishes to (so long as it can get the legislature to pass the relevant legislation). Associates, that had held out from Peru's Brady restructuring some time prior, turned it into a potent weapon. And this bit is crucial because creditors holding out in sovereign debt restructurings prior to this point had had immense difficulty in collecting on their holdout strategy because enforcing against sovereigns in foreign courts was so difficult. The Elliott v. Peru case changed that because Elliott succeeded in persuading an obscure commercial court in Brussels that the pari passu clause entitled it to obtain an injunction against Euroclear (the payment clearing house) paying out Peru's other creditors (the ones who had not held out) unless it, Elliott, was paid a proportional pro rata share. That is, if the creditors holding restructured bonds were paid 100% of their claims, then Elliott was entitled to be paid 100% of its un-restructured claim. And absent equal proportional payment to each, Elliott claimed (and the court agreed) the pari passu clause was violated. 21 The Elliott v. Peru case, however, was decided in Brussels (not a major financial or legal center), and that too on an ex parte motion. Lawyers in New York and London, the jurisdictions whose laws under which the vast majority of foreign sovereigns issue debt, were confident that no judge in their jurisdictions would make a determination in this fashion. 22 And so, the vast majority of pari passu clauses remained unchanged in response to the Peru case in September 2000. Except that is, for a few rare exceptions, such as Venezuela where the lawyers for the issuer appear to have quietly put in a few extra words that potentially defanged the pari passu weapon.
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In December 2011, a full decade after the Peru case, the same pari passu dispute showed up before a federal court in New York. And the veteran New York judge, Thomas Griesa, contrary to the predictions of all those lawyers who had heaped contempt on the Brussels court, basically decided in the same way the Brussels court had.
Indeed, some might say that he went further. Any institution under his jurisdiction (and given that it was New York, that basically meant every major financial institution in the world) was told that it was at risk of being held in contempt of court if it knowingly assisted Argentina in violating the pari passu clause (as per his interpretation of it). 24 Argentina, as a result, was basically cut out of the international financial system-and so, in March 2016, it paid; and paid in full (and much more-given interest penalties and lawyers fees). The relevance of the foregoing for our purposes is that the ability of a creditor to effectively utilize a holdout strategy depends not only on its ability to hold out from the restructuring (which is determined by the vote threshold described earlier), but also on its ability to interfere with the sovereign's deal with the other creditors. As a historical matter, interfering with a sovereign's refusal to pay some creditors (typically, the holdouts) while paying the others (the ones who agreed to the restructuring deal) has been near impossible. The sovereign after all has all sorts of sovereign immunities in foreign courts and, even if those have been waived, the sovereign can always hide its assets in its home jurisdiction where foreign courts cannot reach out to it. In the case of Venezuela, that type of clause was present in the Venezuelan bonds issued prior to 2003 (the ones with the 100% vote requirement issued in 1997 and 1998). Those bonds, therefore, gave holders both the ability to hold out from any restructuring that Venezuela might attempt and a credible threat of being able to use the New York court system to impose high costs on Venezuela if it ever were to do a deal with other creditors without settling with the holdouts. The bonds issued in the post-2002 period, by contrast had vote thresholds of 85% and 75%, with the modified or defanged pari passu clause. This meant that these bonds not only would have a lower ability to hold out (as compared to the 100% one; although the 85% would do better than the 75% one), but would also have relatively little power to use the highly potent pari passu weapon against a non-cooperating sovereign debtor. To summarize, and assuming that we are in a world in which investors are able to price small differences in contract terms, what should we see? The foregoing suggests that the smart money should value the bonds with the 100% vote requirement and a strong pari passu clause more, and especially so as the crisis worsens, than the 85% and 75% ones with the defanged pari passu. More complicated is the question of whether the market will value the 85% bond more than the 75% one, given that neither had a strong pari passu clauses. Whether there is a difference will depend on how much the market values the ability to enforce as compared to the ability to holdout. If a holdout strategy is viewed as valuable only if there is an ability to enforce combined with the ability to holdout, then we would expect not to see much of a pricing difference between the two types of bonds.
However, if the ability to hold out by itself is viewed as having value, then we should see at least a small difference between the bonds, given that the 85% one is going to be, other things equal, easier to hold out from.
To provide a preliminary illustration (before we get into the data analysis), we compare in Figure   1 the yields of the 9.25% September 2027 and the 9.25% May 2028 bonds. Both bonds have the same coupon rate and maturities are fairly close-less than 8 months apart. Importantly, the former bond is a unanimity bond while the latter has a 75% vote threshold. As Figure 1 shows, the 100% bond trades at lower yields throughout -the average yield differential being about -88bps. Figure 2 plots yields for the 7% December 2018 bond (a 85% bond) and the 7.75% October 2019-the 75% bond with closest coupon and maturity to the former bond. Here bond yields are much closer to each other, especially until the end of 2014, and the average yield differential is 19 bps. The overall message of these figures is suggestive that the strong pari passu clause embedded in 100% bonds is valuable, while market participants treat the 85% and the 75% bonds quite similarly.
Data
Our primary source of information is Bloomberg, from where we select zero and fixed coupon USD denominated bonds issued by Venezuela under New York law and outstanding as of March 1, 2016.
We exclude sinkable bonds from our analysis, yielding a sample of 13 bonds. For these bonds we collect from Bloomberg daily mid-yields, prices (mid, ask and bid), amount outstanding between January 4, 2010 (or at the issue date, for bonds issued later than January 4, 2010) and April 29, 2016. We then retrieve from bond prospectuses (sourced from the Perfect Information database) the minimum percentage of bondholders required to change the payment terms of an outstanding bond issue. In our sample of Venezuelan bonds, this percentage takes three values: 100% (3 bonds), 85% (2 bonds) and 75% (8 bonds). The cumulative outstanding amount of these bonds is $23.9 billion, thus representing about 80% of Venezuelan sovereign bonds as of this writing in June 2016. 28 Our empirical analysis builds upon previous work on the effect of CAC provisions on bond yields, using primary or secondary market yields. 29 The dependent variable is the log of the secondary market mid-yield. To reduce the measurement error that may contaminate daily yields we carry out our analyses at the weekly level and derive weekly (log) yields as simple averages of daily (log) yields in the week.
Our first empirical specification closely mirrors Bradley & Gulati (2014) who document a linear relation between bond spreads and the minimum vote required to alter the payment terms. Following Bradley and Gulati (2014) we consider as our primary explanatory variable Vote % , the minimum percentage of bondholders required to change the payment terms for bond i. For a bond that requires unanimous approval from the creditors for a change, Vote % is coded as 1. Our empirical strategy is to estimate the following specification: y %,) = α + βVote % + γX %,) + θ % + ε %,)
(1)
where y %,) is the log of the mid-yield (in %) for bond i during week t, X %,) is a vector of control variables, and θ % is a bond-specific time invariant effect. Throughout the article we report random-effects (RE) estimation results for our specification(s), and cluster standard errors at the bond level to control for within-bond residual correlation.
The vector X %,) includes variables common to all bonds, as well as bond-specific variables (definitions of the explanatory variables are collected in Table 1 sovereign bond yields, the VIX index as a proxy for market volatility (VIX ) , in logs), and the spread between US corporate AAA and BBB bonds as a proxy for the credit risk premium (BBB − AAA Spread ) , in logs). We also construct two variables that measure issuer credit risk. First, we map daily long-term or worse) and 5YR CDS spreads rose to more than 75%. During our sample period, the correlation between the variables Rating ) and CDS ) is more than 90%, which is why in our analyses we include either (rather than both) of these two variables.
Finally, we consider bond-level variables. First, we include residual maturity, given by the difference between a bond maturity and week t (Resid Mat %,) , in log-weeks). The greater the maturity of a bond, the more likely it is that borrower creditworthiness will change during the life of the bond.
Thus, residual maturity proxies for the degree of uncertainty about repayment. Second, we include the coupon rate (Coupon % , in percentage) since there is sometimes a tax related preference for higher coupon bonds. Third, we use the bid-ask spread (BA Spread %,) , in percentage) as a proxy for bond liquidity.
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Descriptive statistics for our control variables are provided in Table 2 .
Regression results for specification (1) are reported in Table 3 . The US-based macro variables are significant and with the expected sign: Venezuelan bond yields are positively affected by the general level of sovereign yields, the market volatility and the credit risk premium. Yields are also inversely related to the issuer creditworthiness. According to Table 3 , a one notch deterioration in average credit 30 The majority of existing studies employ primary market data and thus measure bond-level liquidity with the issue size. Similarly, we could use a bond's outstanding amount here. However, this variable turns out to be timeinvariant (at the individual bond level) in our sample of bonds. We therefore choose to resort to the bid-ask spread which shows both cross-sectional and time-series variation and thus we believe can provide more timely signals of bond-specific liquidity. ratings increase yields by 22.5% (=1-exp(-0.255)). 31 Since, according to Table 2 , bond yields are, on average, 15.44% (=exp(2.737)), our coefficient on Rating ) translates a one-notch deterioration into a 347bps increase in yields. Table 3 further shows that a 10% increase in sovereign CDS spreads leads to a 70bps decrease in yields.
Turning to bond-level variables, we uncover a negative association between residual maturity and yields. Although this may at first be surprising, it is consistent with the idea that for issuers with poor credit quality, the passage of time can offer an improvement in their creditworthiness (in colloquial terms, the yield curve flips).
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Coupon rate and the bid-ask spread do not appear to affect bond yields.
Moreover, yields are not affected by our variable of interest, Vote.
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An explanation behind the lack of significance of Vote is that the relation between the minimum percentage of bondholders required to change the payment terms and (log-)yields is non-linear. Put differently, remember that the bonds with a 100% vote contained a potent pari passu clause, whereas the bonds with the 75% and 85% voted contained a defanged one. That should, if investors were paying attention to the legalese, mean a significantly different pricing relationship between the 100% and 85% bonds and the 85% and 75% bonds. At a first glance this result is inconsistent with Bradley & Gulati (2014) (supra note 5) that reports a statistically significant 2bps increase in spreads on bonds written under New York law due to a 1% increase in the minimum percentage of bondholders required to change the payment terms (see Table IX in Bradley & Gulati 2014). We note however that the estimated coefficient on Vote is not statistically different from zero in Bradley & Gulati (2014) as well for non-investment grade issuers once the authors control for the state of the world economy (see Table X ). Therefore, as Venezuela is a non-investment grade issuer during our sample period, our findings are indeed consistent with those in Bradley & Gulati (2014) to the extent that our variables Bm yield, VIX and BBB − AAA Spread track the state of the world economy reasonably well.
To investigate the foregoing, we estimate the following specification: y %,) = α + β F Vote 85 % + β I Vote 100 % + γX %,) + θ % + ε %,)
where Vote 85 % (resp. Vote 100 % ) equals one for a bond with Vote % = 0.85 (resp. Vote % = 1) and zero otherwise. Note that, by means of Vote 85 % and Vote 100 % we are now coding the minimum vote threshold differently from what we previously did with the variable Vote % . This bears on the interpretation of the βs across our regressions: while β in specification (1) corresponds to the change in (log-)yields associated with a 1% change in the minimum vote threshold, β F and β I in specification (2) encapsulate the differential yield on a 85% and a unanimity bond, respectively, relative to a bond with a 75% vote requirement (baseline). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 report regression results for this specification, and show that, while β F is insignificant, β I is negative and significant. It therefore appears that, while markets do not price differently a 75% and a 85% bond, they do differentiate between the unanimity bond (with the strong pari passu) and the two bonds with the lower vote requirement (and weaker pari passu clauses).
Our estimates indicate that yields on a unanimity bond are 8.7% to 10.86% lower than yields on a 75% bond. Since the average yield on 75% bonds in our sample is 15.25%, the unanimity rule is associated with a 133bps to 166bps yield reduction. To put these numbers into perspective, the interquartile range of yields on 75% bonds is 527bps so that the average yield reduction we document for unanimity bonds corresponds to 25%-30% of the distribution of 75% bonds. One can read this evidence as suggesting two possibilities.
First, putting aside the pari passu clause, the foregoing might be saying that there is a substantial pricing premium for bonds that face a higher risk of holdout problems, but only for those bonds where this risk is highest. It is possible that the market puts a huge value on the unanimity vote requirement where there is a zero possibility of a cram down by a super majority of creditors. That is a possibility, but it is somewhat puzzling why the market would not attach at least some pricing premium to a 10% difference in a vote threshold (between 85% and 75%) when it seems to attach an enormous difference to a 15% premium (between 100% and 85%). That then takes us to the second, and we think more plausible, possibility, which is that the market is not only concerned about differences in the vote thresholds but also the strength of the pari passu clause. To take this back to the question that we began the article with: We are finding evidence that the market, in a near-default situation, is able to parse small differences in the legalese.
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At least, more so than prior research has discerned. The caveat is that we only have a handful of bonds, and only bonds for one sovereign.
Conclusion
Our finding is that in a near-default scenario the markets do seem to be able to discern the difference between bonds that allow for a greater ability to hold out and the others. Prior research, in particular in the context of the Greek restructuring of 2012 had found evidence consistent with what we report here. But that research was looking at highly salient contract features, such as whether the bonds were governed by local (Greek) law or foreign (English) law. Here, we drill deeper and look at whether the markets can discern smaller (albeit potentially significant) differences in the fine print legalese in the bonds. And we find, in the case of Venezuelan sovereign bonds in 2016, evidence consistent with the premise that markets are able to discern these differences.
There remains a puzzle though, which is that our finding contrasts with the existing literature on CAC provisions that has largely found either no pricing difference or a pricing premium for bonds with lower vote thresholds (the latter being the the opposite of what we find). 35 The explanation for this difference in findings may be that most of research on the pricing of CAC provisions looks at countries that are doing reasonably well economically. The investors in those cases are primarily, we suspect, large institutions or unsophisticated retail investors-their reason for investing in government bonds is that they are generally safe investments. In a near-default scenario though, those types of investors tend to exit and are replaced by the wolves of the market-sophisticated hedge funds, many of whom have lawyers who carefully parse contracts seeking an advantage for their investors. 36 As noted above,
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One potential concern with our interpretation relates to the relative size of bonds with different voting thresholds. For instance, if unanimity bonds represented a large fraction of the debt stock, it might be unlikely that they get repaid in full regardless of their voting thresholds. The three 100% bonds in our sample total $5 billion, which is about 16% of the Venezuelan debt stock as of June 2016--probably not too large a fraction. Similarly, it might be easier to hold out in a 75% bond that is small than in an 85% bond that is large. However, bond size is fairly similar across these two groups of bonds: 75% bonds range between $1.25 billion and $3 billion, while the two 85% bonds have size $1 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively. when we compare our results to the research that focuses on bonds in near-default scenarios, they are largely consistent with them. 37 What we document is also consistent with the idea that market participants (or at least some of them) have learned from the lengthy legal fight between Argentina and holdout investors that the absence of collective action clauses can be exploited to block a sovereign restructuring and obtain full repayment. effects regression results to examine the relation between the minimum percentage of bondholders required to change the payment terms CAC provisions and bond yields. The sample ranges from January 4, 2010 to April 29, 2016 and includes 13 Venezuelan bonds. The dependent variable is weekly log-yield.
Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered at the bond level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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